Four experiments tested for perceptual priming for written words in a semantic categorization task. Repetition priming was obtained for low-frequency words when unrelated categorizations were performed at study and test (Experiment 1), but it was not orthographically mediated given that writtento-written and spoken-to-written word priming was equivalent (Experiments 2 and 3). Furthermore, no priming was obtained between pictures and words (Experiment 4), suggesting that the nonorthographic priming was largely phonological rather than semantic. These results pose a challenge to standard perceptual theories of priming that should expect orthographic priming when words are presented in a visual format at study and test.
Long-term priming refers to a facilitation in processing a stimulus as a consequence of encoding the same or a related stimulus in an earlier episode. For example, participants are generally faster and more accurate in making lexical decisions to words studied a few minutes earlier, at least when the words are low frequency (e.g., Bowers, 2000) . This facilitation can last hours, and sometimes longer, distinguishing it from semantic and masked priming that typically lasts a few seconds (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984) .
Long-term priming is divided into two types-perceptual and conceptual (Blaxton, 1989) . Perceptual priming occurs when study items are reinstated in whole or in part at test and the identification of the target or some aspect of it is required, as in the perceptual identification, stem-completion, and lexical decision tasks. Perceptual priming is largely modality specific and relatively insensitive to level-of-processing manipulations (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) , consistent with the view that perceptual representations support these effects. Conceptual priming, by contrast, occurs when participants produce studied items in response to test cues that are meaningfully related to a study item but provide no perceptual information about it. For example, in the category-generation task, participants are asked to generate instances of a category at test, and priming is observed when previously studied exemplars are more frequently generated compared with nonstudied exemplars (Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985) . In contrast with perceptual priming, conceptual priming tends to be insensitive to study-to-test modality changes (e.g., Srinivas & Roediger, 1990 ) and sensitive to levels-of-processing manipulations (Hamann, 1990; Srinivas & Roediger, 1990) , consistent with the view that conceptual codes mediate these effects. Vriezen, Moscovitch, and Bellos (1995) were the first to systematically assess long-term priming in a task that combined characteristics of both perceptual and conceptual tests, namely, a semantic categorization task in which words were presented visually at study and test. For example, participants were asked to categorize study and test words according to whether they referred to artifacts or with regard to their size. On the one hand, this task can be considered perceptual, given that the perceptual attributes of words are repeated at study and test. On the other hand, given that the meanings of words are accessed at study and test, the task can also be considered conceptual. The key question in this study was whether perceptual codes support priming in a test that focused on semantic attributes of words.
The straightforward prediction of most perceptual theories is that priming should be obtained following unrelated semantic categorizations. In this approach, priming is assumed (implicitly or explicitly) to be an automatic by-product of the repeated identification of perceptual information (e.g., Bowers, Damian, & Havelka, 2002; Graf & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Schacter, 1990) . Thus, it is interesting that Vriezen et al. (1995) failed to observe priming when unrelated semantic categorizations were made at study and test (Ϫ15 ms), whereas robust priming (100 ms) was obtained when the same categorizations were repeated (Experiment 1). At the same time, Vriezen et al. found repetition priming to be a function of the similarity of the categorizations, with some priming observed when the semantic categorizations tapped similar conceptual dimensions (judging the size of the referent at study and the relative height-to-width at test, or vice versa) and greater priming observed when the same categorizations were repeated (Experiment 6). In addition, robust cross-mode (picture-to-written word) priming was obtained when the same categorizations were repeated (Experiment 2). Together, these findings led Vriezen et al. to conclude that priming in semantic categorization tasks is mediated by conceptual rather than perceptual codes. These results were taken to be inconsistent with standard perceptual theories of priming.
A number of more recent studies provide additional support for the claim that repetition priming in semantic categorization tasks is mediated by conceptual representations, with no perpetual contribution. Vaidya et al. (1997) reported equivalent within-and crossmodality (spoken-to-written) word priming when participants repeated the same semantic categorizations at study and test (Experiments 6 and 8). Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli (1999) re-ported a series of studies in which participants performed different categorizations: Although no priming was obtained for repeated written words in two experiments (Experiments 1 and 3), significant priming was obtained in two other experiments (Experiments 2 and 4), and this priming was unaffected by study-to-test modality shifts. Light, Prull, and Kennison (2000) asked participants to rate the pleasantness of written and spoken words at study and then perform a category-verification task on written words at test (Experiment 4). Again, equivalent priming was obtained within and across modalities. Similarly, Vaidya and Gabrieli (2000) asked participants to perform different categorizations at study and test and found equivalent word-to-word and picture-to-word priming. And Bruce, Carson, Burton, and Ellis (2000) reported little priming between repeated pictures when different categorizations were performed (Experiment 1) but robust and equivalent word-to-word and picture-to-word priming when participants categorized items as artifacts at study and test (Experiment 3), again suggesting a conceptual basis of priming.
Despite the above findings, we argue that the common conclusion that priming is exclusively conceptual in these tasks, with no perceptual contribution, is premature, for two reasons. First, the role of word frequency has not been sufficiently considered. Vriezen et al. (1995) assessed priming with relatively highfrequency words (M ϭ 80.5 per million; Francis & Kučera, 1982) and argued that the null priming for these items following unrelated study-to-test categorizations was inconsistent with perceptual theories. However, repetition priming tends to be reduced for high-frequency words compared with low-frequency words, and it is sometimes eliminated (e.g., Bowers, 2000; Forster & Davis, 1984) , even for words less frequent (Rajaram & Roediger, 1993) . Indeed, a reduction or elimination of perceptual priming for highfrequency words is consistent with perceptual theories according to which visual priming is an incidental by-product of orthographic learning: Higher frequency words are already well learned and thus show little improvement on repetition (e.g., Bowers, 1999; Bowers et al., 2002) . Of the latter studies that did obtain word priming following unrelated categorizations, Light et al. (2000) included low-frequency words (M ϭ 11 per million) and Vaidya and Gabrieli (2000) and Thompson-Schill and Gabrieli (1999) did not report frequency. Only Vaidya et al. (1997) reported priming for relatively high-frequency words (M ϭ 74.5 per million; Kučera & Francis, 1967) following unrelated categorizations. However, Vaidya et al. did not report the relevant error rates, and accordingly, possible speed-accuracy trade-offs in priming cannot be assessed.
Second, the equivalent within-and cross-modal priming (taken to indicate a conceptual locus) was often obtained in categorization tasks in which the to-be-categorized words at test (e.g., banana) were preceded by a relatively specific category label ("Is it a fruit?"), with stimulus onset asynchronies varying from 2 s, (Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000) , 1 s (Light et al., 2000) , or 500 ms (Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999) . Because the category labels were quite specific, participants may have anticipated targets from the study list, in which case explicit memory strategies may have contributed to the amodal priming. Thus, it is interesting to note that Vaidya and Gabrieli (2000) reported less overall priming when the categorization response at test was "no" compared with "yes" (e.g., "Is it a fruit?" presented for 2 s, followed by the word dog), a condition in which strategies are less relevant. And as can be determined from Vaidya and Gabrieli's Table 2 , within-modal priming was 23 ms following a "no" response, whereas crossmodal priming was only 5 ms, suggesting that priming may indeed be modality specific when explicit strategies are difficult. (Light et al., 2000, and Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999 , did not report priming separately for the "yes" and "no" conditions.) Another way to reduce potential strategic effects is to include semantic tasks that refer to general categories (e.g., "Is it larger than a breadbox?"). Vriezen et al. (1995) used general categorizations and showed a strong trend for more word-to-word (47 ms) compared with picture-to-word (29 ms) priming when the same categorizations were repeated (Experiment 2). And most critically, none of the above studies assessed repetition priming for lowfrequency words when unrelated but general semantic categorizations were performed at study and test, conditions most relevant for testing perceptual contributions in these tasks.
To summarize, previous studies have all been taken to support the conclusion that repetition priming for written words is exclusively mediated by conceptual representations in semantic categorization tasks-contrary to the predictions of standard perceptual theories of priming. However, the materials and procedures of these studies make any strong conclusions on this point unwarranted. The experiments in the present article were carried out in an attempt to clarify the role of perceptual priming in semantic categorization tasks. In particular, studies included low-frequency words and categorization tasks that involved broad categories to minimize the possible role of strategies.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 contrasted priming for high-and low-frequency words in a semantic categorization task when participants either made the same or unrelated categorizations at test.
Method
Participants. Ninety-six students from Rice University, Houston, Texas, were included in Experiment 1 in return for course credit.
Design and materials. The experiments included frequency (high vs. low) and study-test condition (same categorization at study test vs. different categorization at study test vs. unstudied and then categorized at test) as within-subject variables and type of test (categorizing objects in terms of size or naturalness at test) as a between-subjects variable. Categorizations during the study phase were blocked, and for half of the participants, words were first categorized as artifacts or natural followed by a size-judgment task, and the order was reversed for the other students. Six test forms were created for each experiment so that each word was included in all conditions equally often, yielding a completely counterbalanced design.
A set of 48 high-frequency words (mean frequency ϭ 166 occurrences per million, range ϭ 76 -591) and 48 low-frequency words (mean frequency ϭ 2 occurrences per million, range ϭ 1-7) were selected from the Kučera and Francis (1967) norms. All words were highly imaginable so that the size-judgment task could be easily completed. In the study phase 32 words were categorized as artifacts or natural (16 high-frequency and 16 low-frequency), and 32 were categorized in terms of size (16 highfrequency and 16-low-frequency); at test, all 96 words were categorized by one criterion. An additional set of 10 filler items was presented at the beginning of each study block to familiarize participants with both categorization tasks. All 20 filler items were different from the critical items.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted under conditions of incidental encoding: Participants were not informed that any of the words were repeated. The experiment was run using the DMASTER software that synchronizes the timing of the display with the video raster (Forster & Forster, 2003) . Standard IBM text font was used. On each trial, a fixation mark of a "ϩ" was presented for 500 ms and was then replaced by a word for 500 ms. Categorizations were performed by pressing the left or right shift key as quickly as possible, with the right shift key corresponding to natural objects and objects larger than a computer monitor and the left shift key corresponding to artifacts and objects smaller than a computer monitor (depending on the condition). Written feedback in terms of reaction times (RTs) and accuracy was presented after each response. The type of categorization to be made in each block was presented on the computer monitor prior to the first item in each block.
Results and Discussion
In this and all subsequent experiments, participants whose overall error rate exceeded 20% were rejected from the experiment and replaced, and RTs more than two standard deviation units above or below the overall mean for a given participant in a given condition were also thrown out. This resulted in 4.2% of the correct responses being discarded in Experiment 1. The mean categorization latencies for the correct responses and the error rates in the relevant conditions are shown in Table 1 . One should note that the between-subjects factor type of test did not affect the pattern of priming in this or the subsequent studies, and accordingly, data were collapsed over this factor and analyzed in all experiments.
Consistent with the results of Vriezen et al. (1995) , no RT priming was obtained for the high-frequency words when different categorizations were made (4 ms), and significant priming was obtained for the same items when the categorizations were repeated (40 ms). However, contrary to Vriezen et al.'s general conclusion, robust priming was obtained for low-frequency words when the categorizations were different at study and test (31 ms) as well as when they were the same (61 ms), suggesting that word frequency is a key factor that needs to be considered. An overall analysis of variance (ANOVA) carried out on the RTs revealed a main effect of priming, F(2, 180) ϭ 61.71, MSE ϭ 2,039, p Ͻ .01, and a main effect of frequency, F(1, 90) ϭ 5.36, MSE ϭ 2,027, p Ͻ .05. The Priming ϫ Frequency interaction was also significant, F(2, 180) ϭ 5.43, MSE ϭ 1,803, p Ͻ .01, reflecting the larger priming for low-frequency compared with high-frequency words. Still, a simple contrast revealed significant priming for lowfrequency words when different categorizations were made, F(1, 90) ϭ 19.40, MSE ϭ 2,434, p Ͻ .01. The analysis of errors showed no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off: A main effect of priming was obtained, F(2, 180) ϭ 23.02, MSE ϭ 85.61, p Ͻ .01, whereas the effect of frequency did not achieve significance, F(1, 90) ϭ 2.76, MSE ϭ 81.07, p ϭ .10. Priming for errors did not interact with frequency, F(2, 180) Ͻ 1. Consistent with this characterization of the results, an analysis carried out on median response times to all correct responses in the various conditions showed the same pattern of priming: Low-frequency items supported 55 ms and 31 ms priming following same and different categorizations, respectively, whereas high-frequency items supported 46 ms and 7 ms, respectively.
The priming obtained for low-frequency words following unrelated (and broad) categorizations is at odds with the general conclusion of Vriezen et al. (1995) and raises the possibility that perceptual codes can indeed support priming in semantic tasks. Of course, it is also possible that the preserved priming was mediated by conceptual codes, consistent with the claims of Vaidya et al. (1997) , Light et al. (2000) , and Vaidya and Gabrieli (2000) , who also reported priming following unrelated categorizations. Experiments 2-4 addressed this issue.
In another respect, the present findings are consistent with Vriezen et al.'s (1995) results. In the current study, more priming was obtained following the same compared with different categorizations-for both high-and low-frequency words. Similarly, Vriezen et al. reported priming to be a function of the similarity of the categorizations performed at study and test, with most priming for repeated categorizations, some priming for related categorizations, and no priming for unrelated categorizations. By contrast, Light et al. (2000) reported equivalent priming in a semantic verification task when words were previously studied under semantic (pleasantness) and nonsemantic (syllable counting) conditions. Vaidya and Gabrieli (2000) found equivalent repetition priming in a verification task when words (and pictures) were previously named or semantically categorized, and Vaidya et al. (1997) reported equivalent priming when the same categorizations were repeated or when words were studied nonsemantically. That is, in these latter studies, priming was insensitive to the semantic overlap in the categorizations performed at study and test-despite the fact that this priming was attributed to semantic representations.
We suggest that this contrast is attributable to the different tasks used. Two of the three studies that failed to observe an effect of semantic similarity (Light et al., 2000; Vaidya and Gabrieli, 2000) used a semantic verification task with narrow categories (e.g., "Is it a fruit?"), and as noted earlier, this may result in explicit strategies contaminating performance. By contrast, the studies that found priming to be sensitive to the similarity of the categorizations (Vriezen et al., 1995 , and the present study) used general categories that minimize this concern. And although Vaidya et al. (1997) failed to observe an effect of semantic similarity when using broad semantic categories, they did not report the relevant error rates, making it difficult to assess the relative size of priming in these two conditions. Accordingly, we argue that the current evidence is most consistent with the conclusion that priming in semantic categorization tasks is sensitive to the semantic similarity of categorizations performed at study and test. Indeed, this pattern of results suggests that semantics contribute to priming in these tasks. But again, the present study raises the possibility that per- ceptual codes also contribute to priming-particularly when unrelated categorizations are performed at study and test.
Experiment 2
The repetition priming we observed for low-frequency words when participants performed unrelated semantic categorizations at study and test is consistent with perceptual (orthographic) accounts of word priming, but it is consistent with other positions as well. The obvious alternative is that the priming was conceptually based. In this view, the core semantic features of words were repeatedly accessed when making unrelated categorizations, and these core representations supported the priming.
Experiment 2 was carried out in an attempt to determine the nature of the representations that support priming when different categorizations are performed. The same set of low-frequency words was used in this experiment, but in this case, half of the studied words were spoken rather than written. The critical question was whether the cross-modal priming is reduced or eliminated for low-frequency words when broad and unrelated semantic categorizations are performed at study and test.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight persons from Bristol, England, were included in Experiment 2. The participants were a mixture of students (from University of Bristol, England) and nonstudents, ranging in age from approximately 20 to 50 years. They received £3 (about U.S.$5) or course credit.
Design and materials. The experiments included study-test condition (words studied and tested in written format vs. words spoken at study and written at test vs. nonstudied words presented in a written format at test) as a within-subject variable and type of test (categorizing objects in terms of size or naturalness at test) as a between-subjects variable. In all conditions, participants performed different categorizations at study and test. Six test forms were created so that each word was included in the various conditions equally often, yielding completely counterbalanced designs.
Both experiments included the same set of 48 low-frequency words used in Experiment 1. In the study phase 16 words were presented in a spoken format, and 16 words were presented in a written format; and at test, 48 written words were categorized. Spoken and written filler items were presented at the beginning of the study block, and written filler items were presented at the beginning of the test block to familiarize participants with the categorization tasks.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, apart from the modality manipulation at study. On each study trial, a fixation mark of a "ϩ" was presented for 500 ms and was then replaced by a spoken or written word displayed for 500 ms. Categorizations were performed as in Experiment 1. Table 2 shows the mean categorization latencies and error rates in the various conditions of Experiment 2 after 3.8% of the trials were eliminated because of response times falling outside two standard deviations from the relevant mean. An overall ANOVA carried out on the RT data revealed priming, F(2, 84) ϭ 5.44, MSE ϭ 2,056, p Ͻ .01, reflecting robust within-(26 ms) and cross-modal (26 ms) priming effects. By contrast, an ANOVA carried out on the errors revealed no significant effects, although there was a small trend for inhibitory repetition (Ϫ2.3%) and cross-modal (Ϫ.7%) priming that did not approach significance, F(2, 84) ϭ 1.02, MSE ϭ 62.38, p Ͼ .3. Again, a similar pattern of results was obtained when an analysis was carried out on the median response times, with 33-ms within-and 29-ms cross-modal priming.
Results and Discussion
The amodal priming is surprising from the point of view of perceptual theories of priming. But before attempting to interpret these findings, Experiment 3 was carried out to provide a stronger test. In particular, the experiment included conditions that required participants to fully access lexical-orthographic codes to complete the semantic categorization task.
Experiment 3
When interpreting the results of Experiment 2 it is important to note that various evidence suggests that modality-specific visual word priming is mediated by lexical-orthographic codes, including the finding that modality-specific priming is sensitive to word frequency (e.g., Bowers, 1999) , sensitive to morphological structure (Napps & Fowler, 1987) , and extends to Japanese words studied and tested in Hiragana/Kanji scripts that do not share any sublexical correspondences (Bowers & Michita, 1998) . Furthermore, word priming is reduced under conditions in which participants do not need to gain full access to lexical-orthographic knowledge at test. For example, word priming in the lexical decision task is reduced when the nonword distracters are random letter strings-conditions in which participants can distinguish words and nonwords on the basis of sublexical regularities (Bowers, 1999; for similar conclusion, see Weldon, 1991) .
The lexical locus of modality-specific word priming is relevant to the present discussion because it was assumed that lexicalorthographic knowledge was contacted when participants made semantic categorizations in Experiment 2. However, various findings suggest that reading for meaning is often phonologically mediated, particularly for low-frequency words (e.g., Jared, Levy, & Rayner, 1999) , and according to some authors, phonology is computed sublexically (e.g., Lukatela & Turvey, 1994) . That is, lexical-orthographic codes may not be accessed for low-frequency words when reading for meaning. In which case, the observed amodal priming would not challenge standard perceptual theories.
To address this concern, in Experiment 3 we contrasted withinand cross-modal priming for a set of low-frequency irregular words in a semantic categorization task. Unlike the regular words used in Experiment 2, irregular words cannot be read on the basis of sublexical grapheme-phoneme correspondences, and they require access to higher-level orthographic knowledge. We hypothesized that if repeated access to lexical-orthographic representations supports perceptual priming, then greater within-modal compared with cross-modal priming should be expected for these words. 
Method
Participants. Forty-eight undergraduates from University of Bristol were included in Experiment 3. Students received £3 (about U.S.$5) or course credit for participating.
Design and materials. As in Experiment 2, Experiment 3 included study-test condition as a within-subject variable and type of test as a between-subjects variable. Six test forms were created so that each word was included in all conditions equally often, yielding a completely counterbalanced design. Experiment 3 included a set of 36 low-frequency irregular words (mean frequency ϭ 5.3 occurrences per million, range ϭ 1-23; Kučera & Francis, 1967) . In one condition half of the words referred to artifacts and half did not. In another condition half of the words referred to objects larger than a computer monitor and half did not.
Procedure. The procedures for this experiment were the same as in Experiment 2. Table 3 shows the mean categorization latencies and error rates in the various conditions of Experiments 3 after outliers were eliminated (4.5% of trials). An overall ANOVA revealed robust within-(51 ms) and cross-modal (42 ms) RT priming, F(2, 84) ϭ 13.98, MSE ϭ 2,516, p Ͻ .01, and a smaller but significant inhibitory within-(Ϫ4.0%) and cross-modal (Ϫ1.6%) priming in the errors, F(2, 84) ϭ 3.13, MSE ϭ 62.38, p Ͻ .05. It is important to note that the within-and cross-modal RT priming effects did not differ (F Ͻ 1), and given the inhibitory repetition priming in the errors, there is no evidence for a visual component of priming. A similar pattern of results was obtained when median RTs were considered, with 49-ms within-and 35-ms cross-modal priming. So again, orthographic codes did not contribute to repetition priming in the semantic categorization task-contrary to standard perceptual accounts.
Results and Discussion
Although the positive RT priming was more highly significant than the inhibitory error priming (with F values of 13.98 vs. 3.13, respectively), this pattern of results raises concerns that the overall RT priming was due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. In an attempt to address this concern, we removed 3 participants who showed the greatest inhibitory repetition priming in the errors in each of the three counterbalancing file conditions (collapsing over type of test; a total of 9 participants were dropped). Not surprisingly, this reduced the inhibitory priming in the repetition (Ϫ1.1%) and cross-modal (Ϫ1.9%) conditions, F(2, 72) Ͻ 1. More important, however, the repetition (38 ms) and cross-modal (38 ms) RT priming was still equivalent and significant, F(2, 72) ϭ 4.57, MSE ϭ 2,979, p Ͻ .05. The same pattern of priming was obtained on these data when analyses were carried out on medians, with 28-ms and 30-ms priming, respectively.
Experiment 4
The equivalent within-and cross-modal priming reported in Experiments 2 and 3 suggests that orthographic codes do not support repetition priming in the semantic categorization task, consistent with previous studies. The common inference is that semantic representations support this priming, both when related and unrelated categorizations are performed at study and test. An alternative hypothesis, however, is that phonological representations contribute to amodal priming and perhaps play a primary role when unrelated categorizations are performed. Although this later view has not been considered in past studies, phonology is mandatorily accessed when reading for meaning, at least for lowfrequency words (e.g., Jared et al., 1999) , and a number of studies have provided evidence that cross-modal priming is phonologically mediated (e.g., Badgaiyan, Schacter, & Alpert, 2001 ).
The final study was carried out in an attempt to distinguish between semantic and phonological contributions to priming when unrelated categorizations are performed. Experiment 4 took advantage of the fact that perceptual representations of objects are only indirectly associated with phonology, via semantics, and that phonology is not automatically accessed during object perception (e.g., Damian & Bowers, 2003; Ellis & Young, 1988) . We hypothesized that if this is correct, any phonological contributions should be minimal when assessing picture-to-word priming following unrelated semantic categorizations, allowing a more direct assessment of the semantic contributions to priming.
Method
Participants. Sixty students from the University of Bristol were included in Experiment 4. They received course credit.
Design and materials. The experiments included study-test condition (words studied and tested in a written format vs. pictures presented at study and the corresponding written word at test vs. nonstudied words written at test) as a within-subject variable and type of test (categorizing objects in terms of size or as living-nonliving at test) as a between-subjects variable. Again, participants always performed different categorizations at study and test. Six test forms were created so that each word was included in the various conditions equally often, yielding completely counterbalanced designs. The critical materials were composed of 48 pictures with lowfrequency names (mean frequency ϭ 10.1 occurrences per million, range ϭ 0 -34) selected from Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) study. The name agreement for these pictures was 88.3% for British speakers (Barry, Morrison, & Ellis, 1997) .
Procedure. The same general procedure was used as in Experiments 1-3. However, participants were instructed to make semantic judgments to pictures or written words at study. Table 4 shows the mean categorization latencies and error rates in the various conditions of Experiment 4 after outliers were eliminated (4.9% of trials). An overall ANOVA carried out on the RT data was significant, F(2, 108) ϭ 6.35, MSE ϭ 3,132, p Ͻ .01, reflecting robust repetition priming (35 ms) and a tendency for cross-mode priming (10 ms). By contrast, an analysis of the error data revealed a trend for inhibitory repetition (Ϫ2.1%) and crossmode (Ϫ0.3%) priming, F(2, 108) ϭ 2.09, MSE ϭ 36.22, p ϭ .12. Planned comparisons revealed that the word-to-word priming was greater than picture-to-word priming in the RTs, F(1, 54) ϭ 5.43, MSEϭ 3,604, p Ͻ .05, whereas the cross-mode priming did not approach significance (F Ͻ 1). However, the claim that wordword priming is larger than picture-word priming is weakened by a tendency for larger inhibitory priming in repeated compared with cross-mode conditions, a difference that approached significance, F(1, 54) ϭ 2.27, MSE ϭ 41.25, p ϭ .14. In an attempt to determine whether the RT priming reflected a speed-accuracy trade-off, we removed 3 participants who showed the greatest inhibitory repetition priming in each of the three study-test counterbalancing file conditions (collapsing over type of test; a total of 9 participants were dropped). Not surprisingly this eliminated the inhibitory priming in the repetition (0.4%) and cross-mode (0%) error conditions, F(2, 96) Ͻ 1. More important, the RT data was largely unchanged, with significant repetition (32 ms) priming, F(1, 48) ϭ 10.38, MSE ϭ 2,544, p Ͻ .01, no significant cross-mode (11 ms) priming (F Ͻ 1), and a strong tendency for larger word-to-word compared with picture-to-word priming, F(1, 48) ϭ 3.56, MSE ϭ 3,170, p ϭ .06. An analysis of the median RTs of all participants lends further support to this conclusion, with written-to-written word priming (23 ms) highly significant, F(1, 54) ϭ 7.03, MSE ϭ 2,258, p Ͻ .01, and no picture-to-word priming (2 ms; F Ͻ 1). One possible explanation for the lack of picture-to-word priming is that there is not perfect agreement on how to name pictures, and priming may have been selectively reduced for pictures with lower name agreement. This seems unlikely given that (a) we selected pictures with high name agreement (mean agreement ϭ 88.3%) and (b) the semantic categorization task does not involve naming pictures (indeed, pictures were included at study to eliminate any phonological priming in this condition). However, we reanalyzed the data of all participants considering only items with naming agreement over 90%, leaving 30 of 48 items (mean name agreement ϭ 96.7%). The results did not change, with robust written-to-written word RT priming (30 ms), F(1, 54) ϭ 4.06, MSE ϭ 6,845, p Ͻ .05, and little or no picture-to-written RT (5 ms) priming (F Ͻ 1). The same pattern of errors was obtained for inhibitory repetition (Ϫ2.4%) and cross-mode (Ϫ0.5%) priming.
Results and Discussion

General Discussion
The key result in the present set of studies is that written-towritten and spoken-to-written word priming was equivalent when different semantic categorizations were performed at study and test (Experiments 2 and 3), consistent with a number of recent studies (e.g., Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Vaidya et al., 1997) . This suggests that orthographic word representations do not support priming in the semantic categorization task when words are repeated in a visual format. It is important to note that this pattern of results was obtained under conditions in which modalityspecific effects should have been most likely on perceptual theories of priming, namely, when written low-frequency words were repeated in a task designed to minimize explicit contamination.
In contrast with the robust spoken-to-written word priming, little or no picture-to-word priming was obtained following unrelated categorizations (Experiment 4). This finding poses a challenge to the view that semantic representations support all priming in this task (e.g., Light et al., 2000; Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000; Vriezen et al., 1995) and instead suggests that the robust spoken-to-written word priming was phonologically mediated. The reasoning is relatively straightforward. Various evidence suggests orthographic and phonological representations are directly interconnected and that phonology is automatically computed during the process of identifying written words (e.g., Lukatela & Turvey, 1994) . By contrast, it is widely assumed that the visual perceptual codes of objects access phonology via semantics only (e.g., Ellis & Young, 1988) and that pictures are identified in the absence of computing phonology (e.g., Damian & Bowers, 2003) . Accordingly, it is likely that phonological word representations were repeatedly accessed in the spoken-to-written but not picture-to-written studytest conditions. The finding that amodal priming was restricted to the former condition thus suggests a phonological basis of spokento-written word priming, consistent with other findings (e.g., Badgaiyan et al., 2001 ). Still, we readily acknowledge that there was a small trend for picture-to-word priming and that further studies need to be carried out to better characterize the locus of this priming.
Of course, the conclusion that phonology supports spoken-towritten word priming following unrelated categorizations is not inconsistent with the claim that semantics contributes to priming in this task as well. The greater priming following the same compared with unrelated categorizations (Experiments 1) and the finding that priming is a graded function of the similarity of the categorizations performed at study and test (Vriezen et al., 1995) clearly demonstrates a conceptual contribution.
Related Findings and Implications
It is important to note that there are other conditions in which little or no visual priming is obtained following the repeated presentation of written words. For instance, little priming is obtained when written words are studied under conditions of divided attention (e.g., Mulligan, 1998; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; Parkin & Russo, 1990; Schmitter-Edgecombe, 1996) or when words (or objects) are flashed quickly at study using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure (e.g., Masson & MacLeod, 2000) . Critically, priming is lost in these studies even when words are identified at study (e.g., Mulligan & Hornstein, 2000) . Indeed, Subramaniam, Biederman, and Madigan (2000) failed to obtain priming for pictures presented up to 31 times in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence when items were presented long enough to be identified. Accordingly, these findings challenge the standard view that priming is an automatic consequence of identifying items at study.
Still, these latter null results need to be distinguished from the null visual priming obtained in semantic categorization tasks. The most likely explanation for the failure to observe visual priming when attention is divided or minimized (because of brief visual presentations) at study is that the relevant memories were not encoded in the first place (e.g., Mulligan & Hornstein, 2000) . That is, attention may be involved in the encoding of memories that support visual priming, just as it is involved in encoding episodic (Craik, 1994) and some forms of procedural (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) memories. By contrast, the null visual priming observed in semantic categorization tasks cannot be attributed to a failure to encode perceptual memories at study given that visual priming is robust in many tasks following semantic study categorizations. Indeed, one of the standard findings in the literature is that perceptual priming is insensitive to levels-of-processing manipulations, with equal priming obtained when participants focus on the semantic or structural attributes of words at study (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) . Accordingly, the lack of visual priming in the semantic categorization task must reflect processes operative at test. Of the two sets of null findings, the lack of visual word priming following restricted study conditions is most easily explained within a perceptual account of priming. So for instance, Bowers et al. (2002) showed that Seidenberg and McClelland's (1989) connectionist model of word identification can support priming as a by-product of learning. In these simulations we linked identification and learning in that learning occurred whenever a word was presented. But these processes are dissociable in the model: One stage involves propagating an activation pattern from an input to an output layer (taken to reflect word identification and naming), and another stage involves comparing the actual output pattern to an ideal output to compute new connection weights (taken to reflect word learning). This latter stage could be selectively impaired under conditions in which attention is reduced, which would eliminate visual priming but not word identification. Although this explanation might appear post hoc, it should be noted that there are good reasons to distinguish between identification and learning. Indeed, Grossberg and Stone (1986) described a model of word identification in which learning requires sustained attention following word identification. The requirement for sustained attention was not introduced for the sake of accommodating priming data, but rather as part of the solution to a more general learning constraint, namely, the stability-plasticity dilemma (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987; Grossberg 1976 ; later rediscovered and named catastrophic interference; McClosky & Cohen, 1989) . Accordingly, we suggest that perceptual theories can provide a principled account of these null priming data.
However, the failure to obtain visual word priming in semantic categorization tasks seems more difficult to reconcile with perceptual theories. Given that visual perceptual traces are left behind following semantic study conditions, it is unclear why these traces do not facilitate semantic categorizations to written words presented at test (the words need to be identified from vision at test). The absence of visual priming under these conditions led Vriezen et al. (1995) to conclude that attention needs to be directed at the visual level at test for visual priming to be manifest. But it is unclear how to incorporate this constraint into standard perceptual theories. For instance, within the connectionist framework discussed above, any word learning that occurs at study is coded in the connection weights in the network, and these changes automatically improve performance on repeated items. That is, on current models, there is no role for attention in determining whether these connection-weight changes impact word processing at test. If word priming is to be considered a by-product of learning, a better understanding of the conditions in which this learning is expressed in task performance will be required.
Another puzzle that arises from the current studies is why phonology but not orthography supported priming when participants performed different semantic categorizations at study and test. A priori, it might have been expected that orthography would have played a larger role given that words were repeated in a visual rather than phonological format. Although we cannot offer any answers to these latter questions, they do raise interesting issues and constraints for future theorizing.
